1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
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4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
5	Plaintiff, ) Case No. CR 06-320
6	) Milwaukee, Wisconsin vs. ) January 3, 2008
7	DAVID OLOFSON, ) 2:08 p.m.
8	) ELECTRONICALLY Defendant. ) RECORDED
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10	TRANSCRIPT OF FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE CHARLES N. CLEVERT, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12	APPEARANCES:
13	For the Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Office of the US Attorney
14	By: GREGORY J. HAANSTAD  517 E Wisconsin Ave - Rm 530
15	Milwaukee, WI 53202 Ph:414-297-4581
16	FM: 414-297-4361  Fax: 414-297-1738  gregory.haanstad@usdoj.gov
17	For the Defendant DAVID OLOFSON: Federal Defender Services of
18	(Present) Eastern Wisconsin, Inc.  By: BRIAN T. FAHL and
19	BRIAN 1. FARL and BRIAN P. MULLINS 517 E Wisconsin Ave - Rm 182
20	Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202 Ph: 414-221-9900
21	Fax: 414-221-9901
22	brian_mullins@fd.org brian_fahl@fd.org
23	II C Official Departure. TOUN E COULINDUEIM DMD CDD
24	U.S. Official Reporter: JOHN T. SCHINDHELM, RMR, CRR, johns54@sbcglobal.net
25	Proceedings recorded by electronic recording, transcript produced by computer aided transcription.

## PROCEEDINGS

(Audio file commenced at 2:08:40 p.m.)

THE CLERK: Case Number 2006-CR-320, United States of America v. David Olofson. This matter is before the court for a final pretrial conference. May we have the appearances, please?

MR. HAANSTAD: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Gregory Haanstad for the United States.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, sir.

MR. FAHL: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Brian Fahl and Brian Mullins appear on behalf of David Olofson who appears today in person.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to all of you as well.

As noted, this matter is here for a final pretrial conference. The court is also is in receipt of an amended report filed as of today's date.

Are there any other matters outside of the report that you need to highlight at this time?

MR. HAANSTAD: Your Honor, I think that there are I believe two additional matters. There is currently pending before the court a motion to compel discovery. That was filed on December 30th. And I apologize, I had a few documents put in a folder and I must have left it in my office, I don't have it in front of me. But the government has nothing responsive to any of those requests. And I don't know if the court would like to go one by one, if that would be helpful or not, but the

overarching problem --

THE COURT: Let me see if that's in my file. I'm not sure I had that brought to my attention.

No, I do not have anything concerning that motion. Let me pull it up. My computer is not on.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Why don't you go ahead while the clerk is getting that document.

MR. HAANSTAD: Sure. The defense has made a couple of requests of the government and U.S. Attorney's Office by letter along the same lines as what's contained in the motion to compel discovery. And our response all along has been essentially the same, and that is that those documents really aren't relevant to any matter that's in issue in this trial. And none of those matters are discoverable under Rule 16. That is, to the extent they are discoverable under Rule 16 the government has already provided them.

Now, in this motion to compel discovery the defense contends that these things are discoverable pursuant to Brady. And again, it's a little different variation I suppose on the same theme. That is, because none of this — because none of this evidence is relevant it's difficult to see how it can possibly contain any exculpatory information, but it did.

Two issues that are present in this case; that is, the two elements that the government has to establish are that,

first of all, this particular weapon with this particular serial number that at one time belonged to Mr. Olofson and was later transferred to another individual in northern Wisconsin, was a machine gun; that is, that it fired automatically more than one shot with a single function of the trigger.

Second, the government has to establish that the defendant knew that this particular firearm was a machine gun. None of the documents that are requested here really address that.

These are a lot broader sorts of requests that relate to ATF testing procedures in general and that relate to classifications of particular models of firearms, but none of those documents relate to this particular firearm that's at issue in this case.

THE COURT: Does the defense wish to be heard?

MR. FAHL: Yes, Your Honor. And I have some I guess specific responses to each of the eight items of discovery that we're requesting.

Regarding -- does Your Honor have it yet?

THE COURT: She's getting the file. Not at this point, thank you. Go ahead.

MR. FAHL: Well, with regard to item number one which we're asking for documents pertaining to the reports of technical examination of this particular gun, Mr. Haanstad has informed me that there is nothing out there that we don't

already have. And the video that, while it cannot be produced, if not allowed to be produced we can go see it at the ATF headquarters. And so in that regard I guess number one --

THE COURT: So, insofar as the first request is concerned you've asked for and the government has indicated that it does not have any technical examination reports. All right, so why is there a motion being filed with respect to that?

MR. FAHL: Well, that was not clarified until after the motion was filed.

THE COURT: So you're withdrawing that aspect of the motion.

MR. FAHL: That aspect, yes.

THE COURT: All right, go ahead.

MR. FAHL: Number two, a copy of testing procedures that FTB, which is the training branch the ATF uses in the examination, we feel that that is relevant to the published testing procedures that were in place here.

There were two tests. The first test came back as a non-machine gun, and the tester opined that it was a condition called hammer follow. The special agent investigating the case asked for a second test using a more sensitive ammunition.

Using this more sensitive ammunition there was then multiple firings.

And I think where there's no, if there's a policy in place regarding the use of the more sensitive commercially

available ammunition, if that's approved or is that just something that was kind of happened in this case in a case-by-case basis --

THE COURT: Okay, let me stop you there. You're asking for a published testing procedures. When you say published what do you mean?

MR. FAHL: Published in an ATF manual, some sort of policy that ATF has regarding testing procedures.

THE COURT: All right. And is the government saying that there is no, you do not have such documents?

MR. HAANSTAD: Well, Your Honor, the U.S. Attorney's Office doesn't.

THE COURT: Well, that's not the point.

MR. HAANSTAD: No, no, I'm sorry. My understanding is that ATF does not have specifically -- I guess when I heard published that was one of my initial responses was to the extent that it's published it's public and not within the exclusive control --

THE COURT: That was my original reaction as well.

MR. HAANSTAD: But if the actual request is for anything that's written, whether it's public or not, I can follow up and ask ATF again. But, the government's response would still be the same, and that is that material is not exculpatory and is not relevant to the issue, the disputed issues in this case.

1 THE COURT: Well, the first thing we do need to find 2 out is whether or not this is an academic exercise. I.e., is 3 there nothing in writing that would be responsive to the defense 4 request? If there is no such information in writing, then we 5 need not go to the second question or the plateau which is 6 whether or not such evidence is admissible in evidence. Whether 7 or not it's relevant depends on the context. And at this point 8 in time we really don't have a clear context for this discussion 9 because no expert has testified, and I don't know whether or not 10 any expert will reference any policy or procedure or manual in 11 his or her testimony. You have not said so and I can't offer 12 any opinion on the subject in a vacuum.

MR. HAANSTAD: If Your Honor is inviting a response here --

THE COURT: I am.

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MR. HAANSTAD: The Firearms Technology Branch officer who is going to testify will be providing in a way not expert testimony. That is, it's testimony that's based on his own firsthand experience and his own perceptions when he pulled the trigger of this particular firearm.

In that regard it's essentially Rule 701 evidence.

And the way in which it potentially becomes a matter of expert testimony is that the expert will probably also testify as to why this particular firearm fired automatically. Now, that's not an element of this offense. That is, I think the

government's position would be that first element, that is, that the firearm operated as a machine gun, can be established through lay opinion testimony. It's a little bit difficult to understand how it is that the existence or nonexistence of any particular procedures could bear upon whether or not when this particular firearm was test fired it fired automatically.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HAANSTAD: And the witness that the government is going to call to establish that during these test fires the weapon fired automatically is not going to provide testimony or draw any conclusions or inferences based on the existence or nonexistence of any particular policies. He will simply testify that on three different occasions he put ammunition into this firearm and pulled the trigger. And as Mr. Fahl said, on the first occasion the weapon did not fire automatically. And he will testify as to why in his opinion that was the case.

He'll testify that during that first test fire he used military grade ammunition which has a thicker or a harder or difficult to penetrate primer on it, so that although the second round was chambered after the first round was fired, the hammer did not hit that second round with sufficient force to crack that thicker primer.

On the second test fire this officer used civilian grade ammunition and loaded the weapon with I believe it was 10 rounds three different times, and with respect to each of those

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three different times the weapon did fire automatically. Those reports both have been made available to the defense.

And finally, there's a third test fire that the government arranged at the direction of Judge Stadtmueller when the case was still assigned to him. There was some question initially in this case as to why it was that no defense expert had examined the firearm or had really examined any documents with respect to those test fires that I just mentioned. And to sort of alleviate any potential problems in front of the jury as to whether or not this weapon actually fired automatically, Judge Stadtmueller ordered that the government arrange a third test fire and that the government make arrangements for that test fire to be open to the defendant, defense counsel who at that time was different counsel from present, and the defense expert. Again, that video-recorded test fire involved the same officer putting commercial grade, civilian grade ammunition into the firearm and testing it I believe another three times, and on each of those three times it fired automatically.

So none of that evidence and none of that testimony is going to bear in any way upon the existence or nonexistence of any written procedures the ATF has.

THE COURT: Well, that may very well be. But the question then is whether or not there is such material. That still doesn't answer the basic question.

MR. HAANSTAD: Right.

THE COURT: And whether or not you believe it's relevant is not key. It may not be relevant to your case in chief, it may very well be relevant to the defense case in chief.

MR. HAANSTAD: And, Your Honor, I think I was a bit sloppy here and sort of blended two things, that is, the question of relevance and the question of whether or not this material is exculpatory. They're somewhat related, I think, but still are distinct inquiries. And the government certainly will make the inquiry at ATF to see whether or not these things exist.

But I know that with respect to some internal documents that ATF has, the agency has some concern about disclosing those. So I just want to make clear that I will see if they exist and I'll undertake my own independent examination to see whether in my opinion those materials are exculpatory. And maybe it's just a question we have to address later on as to whether if those materials do exist the government's required to turn them over under Brady.

THE COURT: I think that is certainly the way to best approach the defense motion.

MR. HAANSTAD: Okay.

THE COURT: Because the determination of whether or not the information is exculpatory cannot be made unless you know exactly what the material is. And inasmuch as you don't

know what the material is it's difficult for you to take a definitive position and bind the government and thereafter cause this court to rule on a matter in a vacuum.

All right. So, as far as the materials are concerned how much time do you think you might need to find out exactly what exists and the position you will have to take with respect to anything that does exist?

MR. HAANSTAD: I addressed this with some people in the Firearms Technology Branch at ATF in West Virginia when I received the motion on December 30th, and they've been in the process of trying to pull together what they can that's responsive to -- some of them are more easily answered than others. And in all candor I think part of the problem is that it was the holiday season and they're short staffed there. But I spoke with two individuals, Max Kingery and Richard Vasquez from the Firearms Technology Branch just this morning, and as of this morning they were still putting together what they could that was responsive to these requests.

I guess that's a long way of saying I'm not sure how long it will take. I would have to check to see what the progress is right now.

THE COURT: One second here.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: I think it's certainly appropriate for the court to raise a question regarding the timing of this motion.

The deadline for filing motions has passed in this case, that is, discovery related motions and all pretrial motions except for, of course, motions in limine.

I note too that Mr. Fahl appeared in this matter as of August 21st, and that the motion for discovery was filed on December 28th. That motion followed a request of the defense to adjourn the trial. That motion to adjourn was filed on December 6th, and it was for various purposes, such as to give the parties an opportunity to seek a resolution of this case short of trial, to investigate potential defenses including consultation with an expert witness who needs additional time to complete her investigation and prepare for trial in case trial is necessary, et cetera.

So, Mr. Fahl, can you tell me about this motion, and in particular why I should consider the motion at this late date? And in responding pleased advise whether or not there is an expert defense witness who needs this information since it has a bearing on the government's efforts to secure the information and any trial that will have to consider that information.

MR. FAHL: Yes, Your Honor. As I note in the motion, I requested this information for the first time on September 25th, 2007, by letter to Mr. Haanstad. And that was prior to what was going to be the originally scheduled trial.

Mr. Haanstad, and I responded I believe with regard to

items one and three on the discovery request, but that he didn't think there was anything else with the video and that he didn't believe Special Agent Keeku had any certificates and in any regard she wasn't going to testify in as such as an expert that she would need that there was a development.

And that was a conversation we had I believe in the hallway downstairs and was never memorialized. There was no more contact with Mr. Haanstad so I filed a second request, and that request was filed on December 10th, 2007, and both of those letters should have been attached to the motion, that indicated our earlier conversation and requested the still outstanding documents or the things that we have not requested.

Defense counsel has retained expert witness, originally Len Savage from Georgia who is the president of Historic Arms LLC. He has extensive experience with machine guns and automatic weaponry.

The defense has two positions:

One, this is not a machine gun as defined under the statute. And number two, if there were any multiple firings, those multiple firings were due to a malfunction. And a malfunction that can be caused by a thing such as soft primered ammunition, but that does not make this particular gun a firearm.

So each of these items requested has some bearing on his testimony and the potential cross-examination of Mr. Kingery

or Mr. Vasquez.

THE COURT: All right. And again, why the tardy submission?

MR. FAHL: Well, Your Honor, I was hoping that we could resolve this with the government short of filing a motion to compel discovery. And usually in these cases we do, but we were unable to resolve it and that's why I filed the motion.

THE COURT: Mr. Haanstad, can you comment on the timing of the motion?

MR. HAANSTAD: Well, I think that Mr. Fahl is right.

I don't have notes documenting times or dates, but that sounds about right. But our position from the beginning has been as it is now, that is, that we're not required to disclose these things because they're not exculpatory and otherwise discoverable under Rule 16.

And I know that the court's rules contemplate that the parties meet and if there is some sort of dispute over discovery like this that a motion to compel discovery then is filed documenting these previous efforts.

I don't know -- I have nothing further to add with respect to what happened between September 25th, I believe it is -- I'm sorry, September 10th I think it was, but at the first letter request, and the three months that passed before the discovery motion was filed. Again, our position has been the same from the beginning and remains the same today.

1 THE COURT: Well, I know the letter that's attached to 2 the motion is dated December 10th and not September 10th. 3 There's the September 25th. There should MR. FAHL: 4 have been two letters attached. September 25th was the first 5 one and the second was December 10th. THE COURT: I only have a December 10th letter here. 6 7 MR. FAHL: December 25th. September 25 and then 8 December 10. I have a copy of the September 25 letter. 9 THE COURT: Okay, well, would you hand it up? Because 10 what I was handed was just a December 10th letter. 11 (Pause.) 12 THE COURT: The first attachment that I have is a page 13 2, it says September 25th at the top. It's only the second 14 page. And it shows a citation to 11, United States vs. Staples 15 N.D., Oklahoma. 16 So apparently what happened in your submission was you 17 attached something in part but not the entire document because I 18 do have that. I thought it was just a misprint. 19 MR. FAHL: I apologize, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Because the docket does not have a 21 complete copy of what you're referring to. 22 All right. I'll accept this. What about the other 23 aspects of your motion?

MR. FAHL: They're all similar items. If you want I

can discuss what I believe is the relevancy of each particular

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item.

THE COURT: And why should the government provide this? For example, you're talking about training certificates, diplomas, levels of expertise, et cetera, on the AR-15 and the M-16 firearms for Special Agent Jody Keeku.

MR. FAHL: Because it was Agent Keeku who requested the second test using the soft primered ammunition. I believe we would need -- if she does not have any expertise or training on the M-16 or AR-15 type of firearms, especially as it relates to the ammunition that goes in, it definitely called into question the reasoning behind the second test. And this kind of all goes into the testing procedures.

The ATF, it's been well documented, has, I'm trying to think of the word, but the -- can manipulate, they manipulate their testing procedures over time and it makes it very hard.

In fact, there is pending currently before Congress H.R. 1791 which was introduced by Congressman Gregory Georgia to alleviate such a problem, not necessarily in cases of criminal prosecutions, but for manufacturers of firearms who are having a significant problem in the fact that there is -- really seems to be a lack of testing procedures and --

THE COURT: Let's be more specific. What aspect of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure entitle you to information concerning certificates of this person? You cited in your motion Rule 16(b)(1)(C), and you've suggested that

you're entitled to Brady material, but what in particular would entitle you to a certificate regarding this particular ATF agent?

MR. FAHL: Again, you know, really the, under Brady,

MR. FAHL: Again, you know, really the, under Brady, this is the type of evidence that would show whether or not there was an understanding of what was happening by ordering the soft primered ammunition test.

THE COURT: But why would this be exculpatory material?

MR. FAHL: Because if it was -- if the purpose of the soft [Inaudible] test was to introduce a multiple firing and believe that would demonstrate --

THE COURT: But what does that have to do with a certificate?

MR. FAHL: Well, it goes to the special agent's expertise.

THE COURT: That's not exculpatory. Whether or not a man has a driver's license, if a police officer has a driver's license it doesn't make it more or less likely that somebody caught behind the wheel of a car is licensed. If a special agent has a certificate for a particular weapon it doesn't make it more or less likely that the weapon is or is not a machine gun.

MR. FAHL: No. That's true, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So why is this exculpatory? Why are you

1 entitled to it under any federal rule of criminal procedure? Ιt 2 sounds to me like you're asking for material that may be 3 utilized in cross-examination, or may be the subject of argument 4 that may call into question whether or not things were done 5 fairly in your view, but that in and of itself does not indicate 6 that these materials are Brady material or that you're entitled 7 to receive this under any rule of criminal procedure. 8 MR. FAHL: I can understand that specifically with 9 item number 3, Your Honor. But, for example, item number 4 10 discusses this particular gun, not the serial number but this 11 particular manufactured -- the gun was manufactured --12 THE COURT: Before we go on to number 4 --13 MR. FAHL: Okay. 14 THE COURT: -- let's deal with number 3. Would you 15 agree after discussion that this would not constitute Brady 16 material? 17 MR. FAHL: Yes. I agree, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: So you withdraw this request? 19 We will withdraw number 3, Your Honor. MR. FAHL: 20 THE COURT: Okay, number 3 is withdrawn. 21 4, correspondence. 22 MR. FAHL: Number 4 will indicate that the ATF was 23 aware that the gun at issue here was manufactured with M-16 24 parts.

THE COURT: Yes.

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 MR. FAHL: And I believe that's part of the government's theory of why this is a machine gun is because it has M-16 parts. Well, and this goes on to, it's connected to 5 and 6. The ATF has often said that this particular firearm, at least based on representations of our expert witness, that this particular firearm, the CAR-AR-15 by SGW Olympic Arms, is not a machine gun, unless it has an M-16 bolt carrier or an auto sear attached to it. And 4, 5 and 6 would be items that would document this fact.

THE COURT: Mr. Haanstad?

MR. HAANSTAD: Judge, our position again is that none of these things are discoverable under Rule 16. I think if they're discoverable at all, or disclosable at all maybe is the most appropriate term, it's under Brady.

And as with item number 2, again, Mr. Fahl has said these determinations relate to this particular firearm, they don't relate to this particular firearm, they relate to this model of firearm. But the fact that, for example, a manufacturer may manufacture this gun as a machine gun doesn't mean that Mr. Olofson can possess or transfer that machine gun.

The question here again is whether or not this particular gun, this particular firearm with this particular serial number fired automatically. And whatever may or may not have been said with respect to other guns and other tests really has no bearing upon whether or not Mr. Olofson's firearm was a

machine gun. So, again, I think it's the same problem that we had with respect to number 2.

Now, that being said, with respect to 4, 5 and 6, again, at this point I don't know exactly what's out there.

I've spoken to ATF, and more specifically the firearms technology branch about this, and at that point my concern was that there is somewhere buried in this material some sort of determination with respect to Mr. Olofson's machine gun, just because of the way that the request was presented in the motion, and they assured me that that's not the case, that these are much more general than that.

That being said, I was satisfied that those materials were not exculpatory and were not subject to disclosure under Brady.

Now, if the court would like I can inquire further, again reserving the right to make another independent assessment as to whether or not in light of new information there is any exculpatory information in any of these requests.

THE COURT: Again, I would agree with that approach.

It seems to me that we don't need to have an exercise

unnecessarily, and so that we need to first determine whether or

not there are any such documents that would be responsive to the

defense request, and, if so, whether or not the government

believes it should turn over that information as Brady material

or for other reasons under the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure. And if the government does not, if these things exist and the government believes it should not turn over the materials for reasons such as they're not relevant or they are not discoverable because of some other privilege that the government might cite, then we'll deal with that as it arises.

So, in light of what we've discussed we need to find out when we will be able to make some kind of determination, and I gather you can't say at this point in time, Mr. Haanstad, correct?

MR. HAANSTAD: I can't. I can do my best to find out by the end of the day.

THE COURT: All right. I think that probably would be the prudent course. And in light of that I think we need to set this motion aside.

MR. FAHL: Okay. And just to clarify, based on our other conversation I'm going to withdraw items 7 and 8 from the motion as non-discoverable under Brady.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FAHL: And I want to note one other thing. In footnote one on the motion, we talked about some other requests for some publicly available ATF rulings and things.

Mr. Haanstad said that he wasn't going to disclose those, however, if they were in fact relevant or necessary for examination, he would not object to their authenticity.

And I just wanted to put that on the record that,

yeah, I understand he's not waiving any other evidentiary objections, but just a matter of authenticity would be conceded by the government.

THE COURT: Mr. Haanstad?

MR. HAANSTAD: Well, that's right. I mean, assuming that -- again, when the defense asked for publicly available information, again, it's nothing that the government intends to introduce in its case in chief and it's not otherwise discoverable under Rule 16.

To the extent that it's publicly available it doesn't trigger any Brady obligations on the part of the government.

That was my response to those particular requests.

And to the extent that I was suggesting that the defense can go out and get these materials themselves, what I wanted to convey to Mr. Fahl was that, for example, if they can go on the Internet or to the library and get these ATF rulings that are public, the government's not going to object to the authenticity of those documents.

I don't want to state that too broadly just because I haven't seen what they intend to introduce yet, but assuming that the documents are obtained from a reasonably viable source like that I don't anticipate objecting to their authenticity. Probably to the relevance, but not to their authenticity.

THE COURT: All right, that's noted.

Let's turn to other trial related issues. In your

pretrial report you project a two-day trial. Are there any unusual evidentiary issues that might impact the length of the trial?

MR. HAANSTAD: From the government's perspective,

Your Honor, the potentially -- the fact that it potentially has
the greatest impact on the length of the trial relates to the
issue of expert testimony. Each party has identified an expert
witness, and based on what I know about the defendant's expert
at this point it's the government's contention that he should
not be qualified to testify as an expert.

And our position is based on the fact that, first of all, we don't believe that he has adequate qualifications to satisfy the requirements of Rule 702. But also, again, it's not clear at all from the summary that's been provided so far what relevant evidence he's going to have to offer. And to a large degree the discovery request that's been made is tied up closely with this proffered expert testimony.

This is an expert who to this point has never ever seen this specific firearm and has not been present for any test firings of the firearm. I don't believe that he's seen the video of the test firing of the firearm that was ordered by Judge Stadtmueller last February. So the notion that he's going to be able to come in and testify that this particular firearm does not fire automatically more than one round with a single function of the trigger is difficult to grasp.

It appears based on these discovery requests and what we know about this proposed expert that the intent instead is to come in and offer broad criticisms of ATF both with regard to prior rulings that they've made and with regard to current testing procedures. I think I made our position clear with respect to the relevance.

THE COURT: So, are you suggesting then that there should be a Daubert examination of the defense witness in order to determine whether or not he's competent to testify with respect to the matters for which he will be tendered by the defense?

MR. HAANSTAD: Well, I think so, Your Honor. The difficulty I have is I still am not clear on what it is that they propose this expert to testify to.

Again, if he's going to come in and testify that this particular firearm, based on what I don't know, that this particular firearm does not fire more than one shot with a single function of the trigger, I think that we're in the Rule 701 and Rule 602 area and he doesn't have to be qualified as an expert, that is, if he can testify based on his firsthand knowledge or some sort of personal perception that this firearm does not fire automatically.

But I'm getting the sense from the defense that that's not what they're proposing here, that it's broader than that.

And if that's the case then I think we are in Rule 702 area.

And if we are in the area of Rule 702, it still remains unclear
what testimony he's going to be able to provide that is in any
way going to be useful for the jury in determining a fact in

And if we get over that hurdle, then I think it's still useful to explore his qualifications and the other Rule 702 factors.

THE COURT: Mr. Fahl?

issue in this case.

MR. FAHL: Yes. Perhaps I can clarify. I don't believe that Mr. Savage is going to deny that under the restrictions of the test it fired multiple times. The question is whether or not multiple firings qualifies it as a machine gun. And there's a malfunction, whether or not this gun malfunctioned, and whether or not that malfunction could be brought about by using soft primered ammunition.

As to otherwise what else has been considered under ATF rulings and individual determinations in his experience of negotiating the placement or displacement of weapons on an NFTA registry, whether or not this gun, based on even the tests that have already been done, should be placed on that registry. It's his opinion that this is not a machine gun.

This is the same exact firearm -- same exact model of firearm that was issued in the case Staples vs. United States.

And this issue was kind of litigated through the courts there, and I think there was a similar concern about the nature of the

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firearm as to whether or not it should be classified as a firearm.

So, we can arrange, we have at this point a refundable ticket with Mr. Savage coming in on Sunday afternoon. I don't believe an extensive examination of the firearm would be needed. Something we could probably even do over a break on Monday before the expert testimony takes place, which I would hope it would alleviate some of Mr. Haanstad's concerns.

MR. HAANSTAD: Judge, Mr. Fahl says that some of the testimony, or one way in which this proposed expert testimony is going to be useful will be in determining whether multiple firings qualify a firearm as a machine gun. The statute provides that that's the case. That is, Title 26 USC Section 5845(b) provides that a machine gun is any weapon which shoots automatically more than one shot by a single function of the trigger. And that's the jury instruction that the defense has agreed to.

MR. FAHL: There's actually a comment, I noticed -- I just noticed now that we submitted some language from the Staples case which talks about firing until the trigger is released or until the magazine is emptied. That language is from Staples and then was adopted by the Seventh Circuit in the Fleischli case which I don't believe is necessarily the case. There was five-round bursts and then it jammed, in which case the firearm did not fire until the trigger was released or until

it emptied the magazine.

Then I believe that was the instruction that I submitted to Mr. Haanstad yesterday afternoon, but I just now noticed it wasn't in the amended final pretrial report.

THE COURT: You're saying that in the test firing here there was a jam.

MR. FAHL: I believe so. One of the test fires there was a jam.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FAHL: And the factual witnesses from the people who were firing the weapon at the Berlin conservatory all talked about it firing at five-round bursts and then it jammed.

THE COURT: So what does that have to do with Mr. Savage's qualifications to testify?

MR. FAHL: Well, that goes to -- first, Judge, that was what he was going to testify about. As far as his qualifications, I think that's something that's better done through a voir dire of Mr. Savage. I can submit his CV. I know he has testified in a federal court case in Washington, United States vs. Kwan. He was qualified as an expert witness there.

Even Mr. Haanstad's own -- I actually don't know if it's going to be his witness, but somebody he has brought in, Mr. Vasquez from the ATF has had multiple [Inaudible] with Mr. Savage, and I believe, you know, their relationship is fine. I don't believe Mr. Vasquez, unless -- I haven't heard

differently, has any problems with Mr. Savage because Mr. Savage is somebody who designs and manufactures firearms, he used to deal with ATF often to make sure that his firearms are in compliance.

He has extensive skill. He's taken a number of armory courses. He designs and manufactures his own guns. And it's very complicated to create a sort of rifle like this that is not easily --

THE COURT: For example, what? What does he design?

MR. FAHL: He's designed a number of rifles. And he's designed the Bren MKII SA, the Bren felt fed, the RPD SA, the SGM SA and the 971 Sport Rifle, the Gunzilla project --

THE COURT: What about the Bren MKII SA?

MR. FAHL: Pardon?

THE COURT: Did he design the Bren MKII SA?

MR. FAHL: Yes. If you would like, Your Honor, I could give you a copy of his CV which lists the firearms that he has designed, the firearms.

THE COURT: It certainly would be helpful to have that information in front of me when we proceed. It's not necessarily now obviously. I'll take it, but it's not essential. Thank you.

MR. HAANSTAD: And, Judge, I did receive from defense counsel I think it was about a week and a half ago a faxed copy of that CV and have been attempting to go through sort of point

by point and determine whether it's all it purports to be. And I can say that some of it appears from the government's perspective at least to be quite misleading. And it calls into question --

THE COURT: One second. Mr. Fahl, you handed up this information, I'm just wondering whether or not you'd like this -- only part of this information tendered. The first sheet. Is that something you want to keep?

Go ahead.

MR. FAHL: In the end, Your Honor, I think this is something that is best decided when Mr. Savage is present.

THE COURT: I think you're right.

MR. FAHL: We could go over his resume all day, but if he can answer these questions and the credibility in your eyes as he answers these questions I think will be determinative.

THE COURT: Well, obviously the most appropriate time is after the government has completed its case, unless you agree that it is acceptable to have this examination take place prior to the impanelment of the jury.

MR. FAHL: I think after the case in chief. I mean, depending on what happens, I mean, it could be quite possible Mr. Savage doesn't even have to testify. But we don't know how the government's case in chief is gonna go. And in that sense there's potentially that we could, you know, save ourselves some time and effort.

THE COURT: All right. But it does look like we may need to have some extra time built into our schedule for a Daubert examination.

All right, let's talk about other trial related matters. You mentioned the instructions. Are there any significant disagreements with respect to instructions?

MR. HAANSTAD: Your Honor, I think that there is with respect to the definition of a machine gun. And I apologize for this. I know that Mr. Fahl did send the defense's proposed instructions and I thought that I had incorporated all of them, but what he mentioned about Staples and the other case from the Seventh Circuit obviously didn't make its way into here. I must have just missed it because I don't know what those instructions said, so I'm not sure what our position is on that.

But there is another paragraph which as I noted in the final pretrial report there's some disagreement on. Defense seeks an instruction that provides that a weapon that fires automatically due to a malfunction of the weapon is not a machine gun for the purposes of the statute unless the malfunction is a result of an intentional manipulation of the weapon, to convert the weapon from a semi-automatic weapon to a machine gun.

I don't think that the defense has cited any authority for that proposition.

THE COURT: I can't imagine giving that kind of

instruction.

MR. FAHL: Maybe it's -- what I'm getting at, Your Honor, is --

THE COURT: A knife is not a knife unless it cuts you. That's essentially what you're saying.

MR. FAHL: Well, there's a scienter requirement in the statute. And if somebody, the first time a machine gun accidentally multiple fires, they're subject to prosecution.

THE COURT: But that's not the point. Your instruction as just read suggests that if something is capable of multiple firings as a machine gun, but on some occasion does not fire as a machine gun because of a malfunction, the gun is no longer a machine gun.

MR. FAHL: And that's definitely not --

THE COURT: And that seems to be the import of the instruction that was just read.

MR. FAHL: That's not what I intended to -- when you read the statute, it seems that there's a scienter requirement as to -- and it's even in the first part about the knowing possession. So a gun can malfunction and if the defendant is unaware that this malfunction was going to happen, it just doesn't seem like that is something that is covered by the statute.

Whereas, if a gun malfunctions and a person continues to use that malfunctioning gun as a machine gun, then that would

be covered by the statute. It seems that when you read the machine gun, 5845, 26 USC 5845, in conjunction with 922(o), I think there's a scienter requirement that must be there.

Otherwise it becomes a strict liability.

MR. HAANSTAD: The scienter requirement I think is actually provided for in 924(a). But it's also incorporated in the first proposed jury instruction, the second element of which is that the defendant knew or was aware of the essential characteristics of the firearm which made it a machine gun.

MR. FAHL: What we were trying and attempting to do, albeit maybe very clumsily, was to indicate that there's a difference between something -- I mean, obviously you're gonna know that something functions as a machine gun if it fired five times. But the knowledge should almost predate the firing if you understand what I'm saying. It's that if something malfunctions by accident and fires multiple shots, and the government's suggestion is that a multiple shot automatically makes this a machine gun, you know, there would be a lot of people under this kind of strict liability theory would be subject to prosecution possessing a machine gun even though it was the mere malfunction that taking it to a gun shop could have fixed.

And I'm trying to somehow differentiate those two possibilities. I apologize for the clumsy wording of it.

THE COURT: Yeah, I think I understand the position

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you're taking, but as articulated the instruction seems to miss the mark.

MR. FAHL: I understand. I'd be happy to take another crack at it, Your Honor, and do something that doesn't seem so severe maybe.

THE COURT: I think that would be an appropriate way to proceed. So why don't you re-craft that.

MR. FAHL: I will, thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Haanstad, is there another instruction that's problematic from the government's perspective?

MR. HAANSTAD: The only other instruction that the defense requested that I didn't include in the joint final pretrial report was a definition of "possession."

I think -- the defendant here is not charged with possession of a machine gun, he's charged with transferring a machine gun. Consequently, the government has provided the elements for transfer and has provided the definition of "transfer."

I think that -- if I'm not mistaken, I think what the defense wants to be able to do is to suggest that possession of a machine gun also is a criminal offense. And because it is, the informant in this case was arguably guilty of possessing a machine gun and, therefore, had an incentive or has an incentive to come in and testify falsely in order to curry favor with the government.

I guess the government's concern is that by needlessly including this definition of possession along with the elements of the offense, there might be some confusion on the part of the jury as to what exactly it is that's charged here. The statute, again, covers both, transferring and possession, but we've clearly charged Mr. Olofson with transferring a machine gun.

THE COURT: Mr. Fahl? Why do we need a possession instruction?

MR. FAHL: As I'm thinking about it, Your Honor, I'm fine leaving out the possession. The purpose was as Mr. Haanstad described, and we can do that other ways, we don't need the instruction in there.

THE COURT: All right, the defense instruction concerning possession is withdrawn.

MR. FAHL: And I just want to make clear, I'm not sure what we stood on including in the definition of machine gun, the definition of fully automatic and the trigger [Inaudible] firing until its completed. That's from footnote 1 in Staples vs.

United States. We'd like that in there and I don't know if the government is conceding that should be in there or if they're taking a contrary position.

THE COURT: Mr. Haanstad?

MR. HAANSTAD: At this point the government's position is that it should not be in there. It's not required under the plain reading of the statute, but -- I have to say I haven't

1 looked at footnote 1 of Staples. Like I said, I, for whatever 2 reason, I apparently missed that reference in the proposed instructions that were sent by the defense. So I'll take another look and see whether I'm persuaded.

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But at this point, again, it just seems to be inconsistent with the statutory definition which provides that a machine gun is any weapon that shoots more than one shot without manual reloading by a single function of the trigger. More than one shot obviously doesn't, on its face at least, require the complete emptying of the cartridge.

THE COURT: I'll look at Staples also. So we'll reserve judgment on that. Is there anything else?

MR. HAANSTAD: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Fahl? Do you have any difficulties with the instructions the government wants?

MR. FAHL: No, not than as otherwise I've already stated.

THE COURT: All right, and so the court then will generally use its boilerplate including the functions of the court and jury, what constitutes evidence, what is not evidence, definition of direct and circumstantial evidence, testimony of witnesses, deciding what to believe, weighing the evidence inferences, attorney interviewing witnesses, number of witnesses.

And then we go to the indictment. The nature of the

crime charged. Presumption of innocence. Burden of proof.
Weighing expert testimony. And at this point we will probably have knowingly, the definition. And of course the substantive charge in this case. And definitions. Plus, the jury's recollection controls in addition to the court's summary instruction at the end regarding the selection of the foreperson, et cetera. All right?

Now, with regard to trial practice and procedure, I do want to note for the record, Mr. Olofson, that the court does conduct side bar conferences out of the hearing of the jury and uses so-called white noise during those conferences. You as the defendant have the right to attend all side bar conferences and to be present during every aspect of this case, unless you choose not to participate or otherwise attend.

What that means is if we go to the side bar, which is to your right and my left near the window, you can come up, or stay at your seat if you don't want to participate in the side bar conference. All right? Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: I understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You can make the decision either now or later. And if you decide not to participate in any side bar conferences by your absence, that will be deemed a waiver of your participation in that side bar conference only. So you can attend some, you can attend all, or you can attend none, it's up to you. All right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, with respect to testimony, you of course have an absolute right not to testify in this case, and if you choose not to testify we will have a discussion outside the presence of the jury for that purpose, that is, to make clear you are choosing not to testify or, on the other hand, you are choosing to testify. Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, with respect to jury selection. Each side of course has the statutory number of peremptory challenges. Given the proposed length of trial the court would expect to impanel 13 jurors and would ask the parties whether or not there is any preference with respect to the selection of the alternate.

I will tell you my usual practice is to have each side exercise one additional challenge. That is, the government would get seven strikes and the defense would get 11 strikes, and the alternate juror would be selected randomly at the end. So that we would impanel 13 and then at the end of the trial we would throw all 13 numbers into the mixer, pull out one and that person would be dismissed after the jury has been instructed and after that person has been advised that they should remain available to rejoin the jury panel in the event all 12 jurors cannot convene and deliberate until a verdict is reached.

Is that acceptable or do you wish to follow the strict

1 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and/or some other procedure? 2 MR. FAHL: That's acceptable to the defense, 3 Your Honor. 4 MR. HAANSTAD: It is for the government too, 5 Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: All right, we will do it that way. The 7 court also gives to the parties an opportunity to supplement the 8 court's voir dire by asking questions of their own to the entire 9 panel. Do you wish to avail yourself of that opportunity? 10 MR. HAANSTAD: The government does not, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Fahl? 12 MR. FAHL: I quess generally no, but if an issue comes 13 up we'd like to reserve the right to do so if we feel it's 14 necessary. 15 THE COURT: All right. If we need to discuss 16 challenges for cause we will do that in the jury room, and if it 17 becomes necessary to interview any one or more of the jurors 18 with respect to matters that should not be shared with the panel 19 as a whole, we will do that in the jury room. Is that 20 acceptable to both sides? 21 MR. HAANSTAD: Yes, Your Honor. 22 MR. FAHL: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Is there any other matter that we need to 24 entertain today?

MR. HAANSTAD: Not from the government, Your Honor.

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1 MR. FAHL: Not from the defense, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: All right, we are number one for jury 3 selection on the day of trial, so be prepared to proceed at the 4 beginning of the day. 5 MR. HAANSTAD: Okay. 6 THE COURT: Please let me know say within -- well, 7 today is Thursday, so by Monday, Mr. Haanstad? 8 MR. HAANSTAD: Okay. 9 THE COURT: -- what the government's position is and 10 we will have a brief conference to discuss any matters that need 11 to be resolved as a result of your determination. 12 MR. HAANSTAD: Okay, thank you, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: So talk with Kris about scheduling 14 something if it becomes necessary. 15 MR. HAANSTAD: Okay. 16 THE COURT: All right? 17 MR. FAHL: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: All right, is there anything that we need 19 to attend to in terms of your use of the courtroom, your use of 20 Elmo, computers, sound system? 21 MR. FAHL: I don't believe so. 22 No, Your Honor. MR. HAANSTAD: 23 THE COURT: Are there any issues with respect to 24 displays or demonstrative evidence during opening statements? Ι

don't want any last-minute surprises about the use of things

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that were not displayed to the other side.

MR. HAANSTAD: Judge, we've got, I think the government has 16 items identified on the exhibit list at this time. It's possible that some of those items will be displayed during opening.

I guess another question I have, obviously this case involves a machine gun which we intend to display to the jury throughout the trial. And to the extent that it's necessary to show the jurors sort of the inner mechanical workings of that gun I guess I just wanted to raise that as an issue.

I don't think we have in mind putting the gun up and having an expert physically pull the trigger on it to show what happens because we've got some diagrams and things like that that demonstrate that without the need for sort of dry firing this weapon. But the weapon will be pointed around the courtroom a little bit I think in the course of people testifying about the mechanics of it.

THE COURT: Well, I do want it to be clear that it's my practice to have a bailiff check any weapons that are brought in the courtroom. They should be made inoperable when they come into the courtroom.

MR. HAANSTAD: Okay.

THE COURT: So appropriate safety restraints have to be put on the weapon in advance and the bailiff has to check those items. During the last trial I had involving multiple

firearms I will tell you that the jury was a bit put off by the way the firearms were being mishandled in the courtroom and pointed at people even though there were plastic straps through the weapons to make sure that they were inoperable. I just want to make both sides aware of that. You don't do yourself any favors if you mishandle a weapon in front of a jury. All right? Thank you, Your Honor. MR. FAHL: THE COURT: Thank you much. MR. HAANSTAD: Thank you. (Audio file concluded at 13:16:44 p.m.) 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

I, JOHN T. SCHINDHELM, RMR, CRR, Certified Transcriber for the United States District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin, do hereby certify that I transcribed the foregoing audio file, and that the same is complete and accurate to the best of my ability and in accordance with the audio file as provided to me.

Dated June 10, 2008, at Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Official Court Reporter
United States District Court